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I. INTRODUCTION
On July 25, 1985, the Council of the European Communities adopted a
Directive on the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations and Ad-
ministrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning Liability for
Defective Products ("Directive").I The Directive adopts a "no fault" ap-
proach to imposition of liability for injuries caused by product defects.2
A defect is defined by measuring the product's performance against a
standard analogous to the consumer expectations test familiar to Ameri-
can lawyers.3
The Directive contemplated that all necessary implementing legisla-
tion or regulations would be enacted by the Member States within three
years after adoption by the Council.4 To date, however, only seven
Member States have adopted legislation implementing the Directive5 and
only three of those countries Greece, Italy, and the United Kingdom
have complied with the three year deadline included in the Directive.6
* Partner, Jones, Day, Reavis, & Pogue, Washington, D.C.; J.D., Duke University, 1981; B.A.,
University of Notre Dame, 1978.
1 Council Directive No. 85/374/EEC, July 25, 1985, 28 OJ. EUR. Comm. (No. L 210) 29
(1985) (On the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Mem-
ber States Concerning Liability for Defective Products) [hereinafter Product Liability Directive].
2 Id at preamble, par. 6.
3 Article 6 of the Directive provides that:
A product is defective when it does not provide the safety which a person is entitled to
expect, taking all circumstances into account, including:
(a) the presentation of the product;
(b) the use to which it could reasonably be expected that the product would be put;
(c) the time when the product was put into circulation.
Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 A comment i (1975). The Directive focuses on a
product's safety rather than its performance; thus, a consumer apparently cannot recover under
legislation implementing the Directive for a product "defective" only in that it failed to achieve some
expected level of performance, unless the product also failed to provide the expected level of safety.
4 Product Liability Directive, supra note 1, art. 19.
5 These Member States include Denmark, West Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Portu-
gal, and the United Kingdom.
6 In June 1989, the Commission sent warning letters to the Member States that had not yet
enacted implementing legislation, threatening to bring infringement proceedings if legislation was
not passed. Belgium, n.m.n. A/145/89; France, n.m.n. A/146/89; Ireland, n.m.n. A/150/89;
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Because of the recent and incomplete implementation of the Direc-
tive's concepts, there is little factual basis on which to predict the Direc-
tive's practical impact on the jurisprudence of the European
Communities. The conventional wisdom is that, despite the adoption of
American-style strict liability, Europe will not experience an American-
style explosion of product liability litigation. The belief that Europe will
remain immune from a "litigation crisis" rests on a number of procedural
and cultural differences between Europeans and Americans. These in-
clude 1) the lack of or limitations on extensive pretrial discovery, contin-
gent fees, jury trials, and punitive damages; 2) the Directive's failure to
include pain and suffering as compensable items of injury; and 3) the
perception that Europeans are simply less litigious than Americans.
This Article will review briefly the Directive's provisions, identify-
ing several areas of uncertainty or confusion.7 It will then address
whether a sanguine attitude toward the Directive's impact is really justi-
fied, or whether the adoption of a consumer expectations test, combined
with procedural and cultural differences among the Member States, pro-
vides a spawning ground for litigation similar to that seen in the United
States over the last twenty years.
II. THE DIRECTIVE
The stated goal of the Directive is the harmonization of the Member
States' laws of product liability.' The harmonization was deemed neces-
sary due to the perception that "existing divergences" in the systems
of imposing liability might "distort competition and affect the movement
of goods within the common market and entail a differing degree of
protection of the onsumer against damage caused by a defective
Netherlands, n.m.n. A/151/89. The designation "n.m.n." means that no measures have been noti-
fied by the Member State to the Commission. Proceedings are initiated by the Commission through
a confidential (non-published) letter to the Member State.
7 For purposes of clarity, references throughout this Article are to the provisions of the Direc-
tive itself, rather than to the provisions of any implementing legislation in the various states. The
Commission has threatened to bring infringement proceedings against Member States whose imple-
menting legislation differs substantively from the Directive, but it has not yet done so. United King-
dom, n.p.i. A/89/0153. The designation "n.p.i." means that the measure has not been properly
implemented by the Member State's national law, and that proceedings have been initiated. The
Directive's goal of harmonization of the laws of the Member States will obviously be defeated if
states modify the provisions they adopt, but the Commission's enforcement power in this area is
uncertain. The Directive provides that implementation of some of its provisions is optional, and
those provisions will be noted in the text where relevant. For example, Product Liability Directive,
supra note 1, art 16(1) regarding a ceiling on a producer's total liability; art. 15(l)(a) regarding the
agricultural option; and art. 15(1)(b) regarding the state of scientific and technical knowledge
defense.
8 Product Liability Directive, supra note 1, at preamble, para. 5.
Vol. 22:235
PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW
product .... 9
The Directive's concepts are boldly stated and seem straightfor-
ward: "The producer shall be liable for damage caused by a defect in his
product."10 A "product" includes all moveables, excluding primary agri-
cultural products and game, even though incorporated into another
moveable or immoveable, and specifically includes electricity." A "pro-
ducer" is defined as "the manufacturer of a finished product, the pro-
ducer of any raw material or the manufacturer of a component part
... ," anyone who "presents himself as the producer," anyone importing
into the Community products for sale, hire, leasing or distribution, and,
where a producer cannot be identified, any supplier of the product. 2
The injured party has the burden of proof,13 and stands to recover dam-
ages for personal injury or death, or for damage to property, other than
the defective product itself, that is "ordinarily intended for private use or
consumption"'" or is in fact "used by the injured person mainly for his
own private use or consumption."1 5
Each of these provisions raises a number of questions of interpreta-
tion. The more intriguing questions, however, relate to the Directive's
"consumer expectations" standard for identifying defects, and to the ap-
plication of the defenses to liability incorporated directly into the
Directive.
III. CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS STANDARD
The American experience with the consumer expectations standard
has not been a happy one. Reasonable men can and do differ as to what
is reasonable in a given circumstance, and consistent application of the
standard has proved elusive.
The jury system is often blamed for perceived excesses in American
9 Id.
10 Id. art. 1.
11 Id. art. 2.
12 Id. art. 3.
'3 Id. art. 4.
14 Id. art. 9(b)(i)&(ii). Article 9 also states that its provisions "shall be without prejudice to
national provisions relating to non-material damage." Id. Thus, individual Member States can
broaden the scope of possible recovery by permitting recovery of the "non-material" damages, such
as damages for pain and suffering. The limitations of article 9 seem to be an attempt to preclude
commercial plaintiffs from suing for damages resulting from defective products. The effectiveness of
this limitation, however, is questionable, particularly in light of the allowance for damages to prop-
erty "of a type ordinarily used for private consumption." Product Liability Directive, supra note 1,
art. 9(b)(i). Is a computer, for example, a product ordinarily used for private purposes? If so, surely
there is no defensible distinction between an individual's laptop computer and a corporation's main-
frame. However the question of "ordinary use" is resolved, it does not seem likely that article 9 will
represent a significant limitation on the nature or the number of lawsuits.
15 Id.
1990]
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cases, but results that seem to defy common sense occur regularly even
without involvement of a jury. Thus, a Texas appellate court recently
ruled that a liquor manufacturer might be liable for the lethal conse-
quences of a person's decision to consume excessive amounts of alcohol.
In Brune v. Brown Forman Corp.,16 the trial court had entered summary
judgment for a liquor manufacturer, which had been sued by the mother
of a college student who died after drinking an entire bottle of tequila
within the span of a few hours.17 The appellate court reversed and or-
dered that the matter be tried, stating that there was a genuine question
whether the lethal effect of consuming large quantities of alcohol was
within ordinary consumer expectations. 8 This result cannot be attrib-
uted to any peculiarity of the American system; rather, it is a conse-
quence of the deference accorded a standard whose limits are ill-defined.
It is not unreasonable to assume that the parameters of the test will
prove even more uncertain in the culturally more diverse European Com-
munity than they have in the United States. The Directive cannot tell
manufacturers and consumers what consumer expectations are with re-
spect to any given product. In addition, it fails to suggest what type of
proof will satisfy the standard. At least U.S. defendants can appeal to
the common sense and common experience of the jury, but what type of
proof will be persuasive to a single factfinder faced with the challenge of
identifying a community's expectations?
After implementation of the Directive, European litigants cannot
even be sure of the group of consumers whose expectations will govern
liability for a product's performance. The Directive provides no gui-
dance as to whether the relevant consumers are those in the purchaser's
home jurisdiction or those in the jurisdiction where the product was first
put into circulation. For instance, how is a German judge to identify the
consumer expectations that govern the purchase of a German-made
product whose alleged defect has injured a French consumer? What if
the German manufacturer sold the product to an Italian wholesaler,
which in turn marketed the product through French retailers? And what
if the alleged defect is in a British-made component? The Directive pro-
vides no guidance as to whose expectations govern, and no direct mecha-
nism for reconciling the inconsistent results in application and outcome
which seem virtually inevitable among the diverse Member States of the
Community.
Even apart from the cultural differences among the Member States
that make predictions of foreign expectations difficult and uncertain at
best, there are. a number of unresolved issues with respect to proving
16 758 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
17 Id. at 828.
18 Id. at 831.
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consumer expectation in even the simplest case. For instance, the identi-
fication of factors influencing the development of consumer expectations
will affect the presentation as well as the result of product liability ac-
tions. Do producers, through their advertising or public relations cam-
paigns, for example, set standards of expectations which they will then be
called upon to meet in the context of product liability actions? Whatever
the answer to these questions, the nature of acceptable proof remains to
be explored.
IV. THE DmEcrrvE's DEFENSES TO LIABILrrY
Certain defenses to the strict liability contemplated by the Directive
are implicit in the language of article 6. That article provides, for exam-
ple, that a product is defective when it fails to provide the safety which a
person is entitled to expect, "taking all circumstances into account, in-
cluding... (a) the presentation of the product."19 It seems, then, that
effective use of labels, warnings, advertising, and packaging may provide
a defense.20 Article 6 also provides that "a product shall not be consid-
ered defective for the sole reason that a better product is subsequently
put into circulation." 2' This provision is commonly referred to as the
"state of the art" defense.
In addition to the defenses implicit in article 6, article 7 provides
specific defenses. Article 7 provides:
The producer shall not be liable as a result of this Directive if he
proves:
(a) that he did not put the product into circulation; or
(b) that, having regard to the circumstances, it is probable that
the defect which caused the damage did not exist at the time
when the product was put into circulation by him or that this
defect came into being afterwards; or
(c) that the product was neither manufactured by him for sale or
any form of distribution for economic purpose not manufac-
tured or distributed by him in the course of his business; or
(d) that the defect is due to compliance of the product with
mandatory regulations issued by the public authorities; or
(e) that the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time
when he put the product into circulation was not such as to
enable the existence of the defect to be discovered; or
(f) in the case of a manufacturer of a component, that the defect
is attributable to the design of the product in which the com-
19 Product Liability Directive, supra note 1, art. 6(l)(a).
20 In light of the inclusion of producers of component parts in the definition of "producer,"
those manufacturers will face a difficult challenge of ensuring that any warnings they provide to the
manufacturer of the finished product are appropriately conveyed to the consumer.
21 Product Liability Directive, supra note 1, art. 6(2).
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ponent has been fitted or to the instructions given by the man-
ufacturer of the product.22
Most of these defenses are fairly straightforward, but the one that has
already generated controversy is the optional "risk of development" de-
fense contained in article 7(e).
V. STATE OF THE ART VS. RISK OF DEVELOPMENT
The article 6(2) "state of the art" defense is actually narrower than
the "state of the art" defense familiar to U.S. litigators. The intent of the
Directive seems to be to focus attention properly on consumer expecta-
tions at the time the product is distributed 23 and to prevent identification
of a defect by measuring a product's performance against more sophisti-
cated expectations that have been developed by product improvements.
The significance of this provision is that the product will not be deemed
defective if it provided the level of safety which consumers were entitled
to expect at the time of distribution.
By contrast, the "risk of development" defense of article 7(e) ex-
cuses a producer from liability associated with an admitted defect (no
liability attaches if "the existence of the defect" could not have been dis-
covered). The controversy surrounding adoption of this provision is re-
flected in the fact that its implementation is optional24 and in the
Commission's undertaking to report to the Council by 1995 on the effect
of rulings relating to this section.25 It seems inevitable that any producer
seeking to escape liability by using this defense will face conflicting evi-
dence regarding the actual state of scientific and technical knowledge
that might have allowed discovery of the defect at the time the product
was put into circulation. Pharmaceutical manufacturers are the most ob-
vious "producers" likely to assert this defense, and indeed, the defense
may be necessary in order not to discourage product innovations in this
field. This type of defense does, however, raise the specter of the "liabil-
22 Id. art. 7.
23 Article 6(l)(c) of the Directive specifically provides that "the time when the product was put
into circulation" is one of the circumstances to be taken into account when determining the level of
safety a person is entitled to expect.
24 Product Liability Directive, supra note 1, art. 15(l)(b). So far, Luxembourg has failed to
include this provision in its implementing legislation. The United Kingdom has adopted a risk of
development defense that differs from the Directive formulation. The U.K. Consumer Protection
Act 1987, ch. 43, part I 4(l)(e) provides a defense to the producer who shows
that the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the relevant time was not such that a
producer of products of the same description as the product in question might be expected
to have discovered the defect if it had existed in his products while they were under his
control.
The Commission has threatened to institute infringement proceedings against the United Kingdom
because of the substantive modification to this section.
25 Product Liability Directive, supra note 1, art. 15(3).
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ity by hindsight" which the Directive apparently tried to avoid by adopt-
ing article 6(2).
Finally, analysis of the "state of the art" defense of article 6(2) raises
intriguing questions about whether a claimant could use the defense of-
fensively. It does not seem unreasonable that consumer expectations of
any given product might be established by showing that no safer product
could be made,2 6 as consumer expectations should be limited by the tech-
nical capabilities of manufacturers. This use of "state of the art" does
not seem to be contemplated by the Directive, nor does it seem to be
excluded by it.
Once "state of the art" is accorded a central role in determining the
most basic question of liability, is it not reasonable for a claimant to also
avail himself of this concept by showing that the "state of the art" per-
mitted manufacture of a safer product that would have conformed to
high consumer expectations of safety? It seems inconsistent with the Di-
rective's goal of protecting the consumer 2 7 to preclude aggressive and
offensive use of the "state of the art" defense, but such a tactic is cer-
tainly several steps removed from the deceptively simple language of the
Directive. The possibility that the Directive's recognition of a "state of
the art" defense might be stretched to provide an independent basis for
proving defects does not seem so far-fetched, in light of the consumer-
protectionist policies prevalent in Europe.28
VI. POTENTIAL FOR INTERJURISDICTIONAL CONFLICTS
Resolution of issues relating to application of the consumer expecta-
tions test and the various defenses to liability may or may not become the
subject of bitter litigation in Europe. Assuming the European Commu-
nity can find some way to resolve these issues amicably, and even assum-
ing uniform implementation of the Directive, it is not at all certain that
the hoped-for harmonization of laws among the Member States can be
achieved. Because the Directive leaves the resolution of several impor-
tant issues to the Member States, such as the role of contributory fault2 9
26 As the claimant has the burden of proving defect under the terms of article 4, the defendant
producer would likely take the first step in the offensive use of "state of the art" in order to rebut the
claimant's proof.
27 The Directive mentions protection of the consumer throughout the considerations.
28 These policies are apparent in the draft directive concerning product safety, COM(89) 162
final, Apr. 27, 1989, 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 193) 1 (1989) (Proposal for a Council Directive
Concerning General Product Safety). This draft proposes to establish a "general safety requirement
for any product placed on the market, namely that such products do not present any unacceptable
risks and that potential users are warned of any remaining risks." Id at preamble, seventh consider-
ation. In its current form, this draft directive would not provide a private right of action but would
permit states to remove from their marketplace any product that failed to meet the safety standard.
29 Product Liability Directive, supra note 1, art. 8(2).
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and the availability of nonmaterial damages,30 and makes the adoption of
key provisions, such as the availability of the "risk of development" de-
fense optional, significant differences in outcome are to be expected.3'
Apart from the differences built into the Directive, significantly dif-
ferent outcomes by courts presented with similar facts seem inevitable in
light of the number of diverse jurisdictions that will attempt to apply the
law. A cursory review of recent U.S. product liability decisions reveals
the potential for result-determinative interjurisdictional conflicts, even in
the application of supposedly uniform law. The following examples,
while perhaps not directly transferable to the European experience, are
nevertheless instructive because the directly contradictory results cannot
be attributed solely to the peculiarities of the U.S. system. These exam-
ples illustrate the vast potential for conflicting results, even when a single
legal concept is applied to a similar set of facts.
The first example involves the applicability of the "learned interme-
diary" defense to manufacturers of intra-uterine devices ("IUDs"). Re-
cently, a federal appellate court applying Arkansas law reversed
summary judgment that had been entered in favor of Searle Laboratories,
manufacturer of a particular type of copper IUD, the CU-7.32 The three
judge appellate panel held that the "learned intermediary" defense was
not applicable to manufacturers of IUDs. Thus, Searle could be held
liable for failing to "personally warn" IUD purchasers of the product's
risks, despite the admittedly adequate warnings provided to physicians.33
Just two days later, in a case involving the same defendant and the same
product, the Delaware Supreme Court reached exactly the opposite con-
clusion, affirming summary judgment in favor of Searle.34 The Delaware
court found that Searle had satisfied its duty to warn consumers by pro-
viding adequate warnings to learned intermediaries, the physicians who
were to insert the devices.35 Juries were not involved at any stage of
either case, nor were there any substantive differences in the applicable
law. Rather, the Arkansas court made a factual determination that a
patient's independent choice to purchase an IUD made the device more
like a consumer product than like a drug, the product category to which
the "learned intermediary" defense had previously been applied.
Another example of interjurisdictional legal conflicts involves the
Clark Equipment Company, manufacturer of a style of front-end loader
that allegedly had a propensity to catch fire, destroying the machine.
The question presented in a series of strict liability actions against the
30 Id. art. 9.
31 Id. arts. 7(e), 15(1)(b).
32 Hill v. Searle Laboratories, 884 F.2d 1064, 1070 (8th Cir. 1989).
33 Id. at 1071.
34 Lacy v. G.D. Searle & Co., 567 A.2d 398 (Del. 1989).
35 Id. at 398.
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manufacturer was whether purely economic damages, in this instance,
the cost to replace the front-end loader, could be recovered in product
liability actions.36 The U.S. Supreme Court had addressed this issue and
determined that economic damages were not properly recoverable in
product liability actions.37
The Supreme Court's opinions on such a question of product liabil-
ity law are not binding on the states, but they are certainly persuasive.
The East River decision was analyzed by each of three decisions last year
relating to the Clark Equipment Company's front-end loaders. In the
first of those decisions, the Alabama Supreme Court adopted the U.S.
Supreme Court's analysis and affirmed summary judgment for Clark
Equipment Company, holding that it was not strictly liable for the eco-
nomic damages to the product due to the alleged defect.38
Just a month later, however, the West Virginia Supreme Court re-
fused to reverse an award against Clark Equipment Company, holding
that economic damages could be recovered in strict liability actions
where the damage was the result of a "sudden, calamitous event" which
posed a danger of personal injury, even if unrealized.3 9 A few months
later, an appellate court in Pennsylvania also followed the U.S. Supreme
Court's reasoning and ordered the trial court to enter judgment for Clark
Equipment Company.' In doing so, however, the Pennsylvania court
expressly reserved judgment on the question of whether the result would
be different if the parties were not both commercial enterprises.4
Thus, in the span of a few months, a manufacturer of an allegedly
defective product was found not liable for certain damages in one juris-
diction, liable for those same damages in another jurisdiction, and not
liable in a third jurisdiction, at least as long as the plaintiff was a com-
mercial entity. Juries were not involved in these result-determinative de-
cisions, which referenced a single source of supposedly uniform law.
The perception of a simiilar potential for interjurisdictional differ-
ences in application of the Directive does not seem unwarranted. In fact,
this potential seems to be tacitly encouraged by the Directive, which
leaves issues such as contributory and comparative fault and the inter-
play of contractual remedies for resolution by the Member States accord-
ing to their own law.42
36 Lloyd Wood Coal Co. v. Clark Equipment Co., 543 So.2d 671, 672 (Ala. 1989).
37 East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 876 (1986).
38 Lloyd Wood Coal Co., 543 So.2d at 672.
39 Capitol Fuels, Inc. v. Clark Equipment Co., 382 S.E.2d 245 (W. Va. 1989).
40 REM Coal Co., Inc. v. Clark Equipment Co., 386 Pa. Super. 401, 409, 563 A.2d 128, 132
(1989).
41 Id. at 413, 563 A.2d at 134.
42 Product Liability Directive, supra note 1.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The Directive does not resolve several potentially result-determina-
tive issues. Whether the resolution of those issues will result in judicial
harmony among the Member States is debatable. The predictions that
the anticipated unity among the European states win preclude the type of
interjurisdictional conflicts described above, and that the civil law will
not tolerate the extreme applications of the consumer expectations stan-
dard experienced in the U.S. common law jurisdictions may well be true,
but the opposite outcome seems equally as likely.
